Beware of Courts Bearing Gifts: Transparency and the Court of Justice of the European Union by Costa, M. & Peers, S.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Costa, M. and Peers, S. (2019). Beware of Courts Bearing Gifts: Transparency 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union. European Public Law, 25(3), pp. 403-420. 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22787/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
Beware of Courts Bearing Gifts: Transparency and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
  
 
This paper reconsiders the principle of transparency in the European Union 
(EU) legal order and takes as its focal point the contribution of the EU Courts 
as regards the presumptions of non-disclosure of EU documents. The aim is 
to investigate the role played by the judiciary in relation to a twofold question: 
How open can the Union’s decision-making be, and is it possible for citizens 
to participate in the decision-making process of EU institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies? The paper argues that accountability deficits in the field of 
access to documents have been filled, to an extent, by the EU Courts’ 
imposition of boundaries on the broad derogations to the right. But 
nevertheless, the paper concludes that the establishment through the case 
law of general presumptions against openness has fundamentally worsened 
the standards of accountability. Rather regrettably, although the EU 
legislature set the default position to the widest access to documents, this has 
been reversed to non-disclosure by the EU judiciary as regards non-legislative 
documents. 
 
Keywords: transparency; access to documents; general presumptions, 
Regulation 1049/2001 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper examines the problematic aspects of the EU’s access to 
documents regime, namely the ambiguously drafted derogations from the 
right of access to documents and the development of general presumptions of 
non-disclosure of documents through the case law. In particular, the paper 
argues that the EU Courts’ imposition of boundaries on the derogations to the 
access right mitigates, to an extent, the problematic aspects of the access 
rules. Yet, the more recent development (by the same courts) of a set of 
presumptions against openness has actually worsened the standards of 
accountability by reversing the default position, specifically in relation to non-
legislative documents, from the widest possible access to non-disclosure.  
 
To substantiate this, the paper firstly examines the legislative framework as 
regards the access to documents rules and outlines the contribution of the EU 
Courts before the adoption of the EU’s Transparency Regulation from the 
point of view of accountability. Secondly, the paper assesses in detail whether 
the framework incorporated by the Transparency Regulation,1 as applied to 
date, enhances openness in the decision-making process. The paper 
concludes that, as regards non-legislative documents, the net effect of judicial 
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and Commission documents [2001] OJ L145/43.   
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developments in the area of presumptions is to reduce the standards for 
public accountability that previously applied.  
 
Overview of the legislative background 
 
It is often alleged that the EU’s decision-making is insufficiently transparent 
and that accountability deficits are even growing, something which 
compromises the Union’s overall legitimacy.2 The widespread notion that the 
Union’s decision-making process lacked accountability and legitimacy3 was 
highlighted by the problems that arose during the process of ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 4  In consequence, the EU institutions had to consider 
alternatives that would rectify this public disinterest and would bring the Union 
closer to the citizens. Access to documents was seen from the early days as a 
major part of the solution to the Union’s legitimacy problems and has been at 
the core of transparency efforts.5   
 
The initial step, which proved to be the cornerstone of the public’s 
fundamental right to information, was a Declaration on transparency attached 
to the Final Act of the Maastricht Treaty. This provided that transparency 
enhances the democratic credentials of the institutions and increases the 
public’s confidence in the administration.6 It illustrated the political willingness 
for the establishment of a “right” of access to information and is commonly 
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considered as the beginning of a more transparent era in the EU. 7  In 
response to the Declaration and with the aim of bringing the Union closer to 
the citizens, the Commission first surveyed national law on access to 
documents and then released a communication on the issue.8 In the same 
year the Code of Conduct9 on access to documents was adopted and shortly 
afterwards implemented by the Council10 and the Commission.11  
 
The next step towards more transparency came with the Treaty of Amsterdam 
which provided that decisions need to be taken as openly and closely as 
possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU). More importantly, under old Article 255 
EC (added by the Treaty of Amsterdam) any EU citizen and any natural or 
legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State could 
have access to EP, Council and Commission documents. Access was to be 
denied for the protection of certain public and private interests to be 
determined by the Council under the then co-decision procedure. Currently, 
Article 15 TFEU (which replaced Article 255 EC) requires all the EU organs to 
conduct their work openly. These Treaty amendments show clearly the 
political consensus to incorporate the principle of transparency in the EU. 
What is less clear, however, is the exact status of transparency in the EU 
legal order due to national divergences on the issue. 12     
 
    
The pre-Regulation regime: The Code of Conduct  
 
The main principle enshrined in the Code was that of the “widest possible 
access to documents”13 and the narrowest interpretation of the exceptions, 
the latter being a corollary of the former. The Code provided for access to be 
denied where disclosure could undermine the protection of certain public and 
private interests. Nevertheless, the very wide non-exhaustive list of mandatory 
exceptions 14  effectively changed the balance from positive rights with 
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negative exceptions to a text which treated access as the exception. Even 
after the enactment of the Code there was dissatisfaction with the state of 
openness. The Council and the Commission, based on a system of secrecy, 
were reluctant to implement the Code in favour of openness.15 This led to the 
consistent refusal of various documents. As a result, the EU Courts handed 
down several judgments interpreting the Council’s and the Commission’s 
decisions denying access under the Code.  
 
The Court of First Instance, now the General Court, held, for instance, that the 
exceptions must be justified on objective grounds and be applied strictly in a 
manner that did not defeat the application of the widest possible access.16 
More importantly, the Courts ruled that abstract and general justifications 
could not be accepted and that the institutions were obliged to state reasons. 
In doing so, the institutions needed to carry out a concrete and individual 
assessment before deciding whether or not to release the requested 
documents.17 The risk of the public or private interest being undermined must 
be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.18  
 
In this regard, the Court of First Instance ruled in Kuijer (II)19 that the Council 
had wrongly applied the exception for ‘international relations’. In the Court’s 
view, the Council failed to consider whether there was a risk that the Union’s 
relations with third countries would be prejudiced if the documents in question 
were released. Instead of making this specific examination, refusal was based 
on general statements and assumptions rather than on an analysis of factors 
which effectively may undermine the exception. Yet, in limited circumstances, 
the requirement of a document-by-document assessment can be abandoned 
under the “administrative burden rule” whereas the institutions can balance 
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the work that they will have to bear against the public interest in gaining 
access. In other words, excessive administrative work caused by a request 
may allow the institution to derogate from the principle of widest access.20  
 
 
Regulation 1049/2001 and the relevant case law 
 
The principle of transparency was established formally in the EU legal order 
with the adoption of Regulation 1049/2001 which governs, at the time of 
writing, the fundamental21 right of citizens and residents in the EU to access, 
in principle, all the documents drawn or held by the EP, Council and 
Commission.22 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Regulation, all documents held by 
the EU organs are currently subject to the access rules. This marked a 
significant positive change to the pre-Regulation regime. As already explained 
above, under the Code of Conduct, requests for documents held by the 
institutions but authored by third parties and Member States needed to be 
directed to them since they were not covered by the access rules.23  
 
The adoption of the Regulation was seen as a real triumph for the advocates 
of transparency in the EU. 24 For the first time in the history of European 
integration, EU law set out the binding requirements for securing the 
democratic right of an informed citizenry. This Regulation reflects the overall 
intention, already specified in the second subparagraph of Article 1 TEU, to 
mark a new stage in the process of creating an even closer Union among the 
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as 
possible to the citizen. Similarly, Recital 2 of the Regulation’s Preamble 
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clarifies that there is a direct causal link between the fundamental right of EU 
citizens and residents to have access to information with the democratic 
nature of the institutions. This formal ability of the public to participate, 
influence and monitor the decision-making process intended to increase the 
state of accountability in the EU as well as to secure open performance in the 
decision-making process. Seen from this perspective, access to documents is 
considered to be an essential accountability component, since without 
information on what basis decisions are being taken, and by whom, it is 
impossible for the various accountability forums to hold the actors to account. 
Yet, there are a number of ambiguous provisions within the Regulation which 
highlight the level of political disagreement over the exact status of 
transparency in the EU legal order. It is this ambiguity that imposes an extra 
duty upon the EU Courts to establish the right balance amongst the various 
interests at stake.  
 
In April 2008, the Commission published a legislative proposal to recast the 
Regulation.25 Following the publication of the Commission’s proposal, the EP 
adopted a number of amendments and, after the Parliament’s requests, the 
Commission adopted a later proposal. 26  On 15 December 2011, the EP 
approved the proposal. 27  Yet, the amendment process has not been 
progressed in the Council. The weak points of the current regime, as already 
explained above, stem predominantly from the broad exceptions enshrined in 
the Regulation. Thus, in the amendment process, emphasis must be based 
upon the task of clarifying the exceptions. Rather regrettably, the procedure to 
recast the current access regime provides evidence to the contrary and the 
proposal itself is far from securing transparency.  
 
In particular, Article 2(6) of the Commission’s proposal reduces dramatically 
the current standards since it would leave outside the scope of the Regulation 
documents relating to individual decisions and investigations until the decision 
has been taken and the investigation has been closed or the act has become 
definitive. In addition, “documents containing information gathered or obtained 
from natural or legal persons by an institution in the framework of such 
investigations shall not be accessible to the public even after the closure of 
the investigation”. At present, Article 4(2) of the Regulation provides that the 
disclosure of documents which would undermine the protection of inspections, 
investigations and audits shall be refused, unless there is an overriding public 
interest following disclosure. If the proposed provision is adopted this would 
constitute a step backwards in terms of the existing status quo, since this 
provision would not be protected by an overriding public interest in disclosure.  
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There are four types of exceptions provided by the Regulation: mandatory, 
“discretionary”, the protection of the decision-making process and, finally, 
documents originating from third parties and Member States. The first 
category of exceptions (Article 4(1) of the Regulation) precludes access to 
any of the documents falling within it and calls for no balancing of interests at 
stake. If the institutions can prove that the documents fall into this category, 
refusal is automatically justified.28 The second category, set out in Article 4(2), 
is not really discretionary, since uses the same mandatory language (“shall 
refuse”) as the exceptions in Article 4(1), but is subject to a public interest 
override in favour of disclosure.  
 
Thirdly, the decision-making exception in Article 4(3) is the equivalent of the 
confidentiality exception under the Code of Conduct. However, the test in the 
Regulation sets a higher threshold for non-disclosure than under the Code of 
Conduct. Specifically, it requires that the disclosure “significantly undermines” 
the decision-making of the EU institutions. Accordingly, the balance is tipped 
towards disclosure. Fourthly, with regards to documents drafted by third 
parties and Member States, Article 4(4) and (5) requires the institution to 
consult the third party for determining whether the exceptions of Article 4(1) 
and (2) are applicable, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not be 
disclosed. 
 
The pre-Regulation case law has, to a large extent, been incorporated into 
this Regulation and the interpretation of the old rules is still applicable unless 
clearly stated otherwise.29 This is justified by Recital 3 of the Regulation’s 
Preamble, which states that the Regulation “consolidates the initiatives which 
the institutions have already taken”. Essentially, the jurisprudence towards the 
right of access has developed two approaches. The first one was described 
as “marginal review”, whereas the second was called as the “foreseeability 
standard”. 30  The former approach relates to the fact that the institutions 
exercise wide discretion when they apply the exception31 and in consequence 
                                                 
28
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31
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Sison v Council (C-266/05 P) EU:C:2007:75 [15]: ‘in areas covered by the mandatory 
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judicial review is significantly restrained. The latter confirms the requirement 
for the widest possible access so long as the risk to harm the protected 
interest is not merely hypothetical.  
 
Despite the careful and consistent emphasis of the EU Courts in opening up 
the overall decision-making process, there is a parallel development of a set 
of general presumptions against openness (see below), which reveals the 
existence of a paradox within that line of case law. Arguably, general 
presumptions defeat the very purpose of the widest access which is 
emphasised categorically during the past 20 years in the case law.32 More 
fundamentally, this approach reveals that the EU Courts have taken a rather 
limited line on openness which necessarily contributes to the on-going debate 
about the lack of accountability in the EU. To substantiate this, the application 
of the exceptions regarding legislative, administrative and judicial documents, 
as per settled case law, is discussed below. 
 
Legislative Documents 
 
In Turco,33 the applicant requested access to an opinion of the Council’s legal 
service relating to a proposal for a Council Directive laying down the minimum 
standards for the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States.34 The 
General Court, in keeping with prior case law, reiterated that denial of access 
must be based on a concrete and individual examination. But nevertheless, 
the Council’s generality in its refusal was this time justified by the fact that 
giving additional information would deprive the exception relied upon of its 
effect.35 The rationale behind the legal advice exception, according to the 
Court, is to avoid uncertainty by raising doubts over the legality of EU 
legislation,36 to secure the independence of the legal service and to protect 
the interest of the institution to receive independent and frank legal advice.37 
In essence, the Court ruled that the legal advice exception should escape the 
well-established duty, incumbent on institutions, to carry out the case-by-case 
assessment and that the public interest override will never apply to such 
advice. In other words, it would be impossible to imagine a case in which the 
override would ever be applied in practice as regards legal advice.  
 
In relation to legislative matters, this case law can no longer be considered as 
good law. The Court of Justice, in the joined cases of Sweden and Turco v 
Council,38 invalidated the General Court’s reasoning, upheld the appeal and 
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ruled that legal advice given in the remit of legislative procedures must be 
released. The judgment addressed how institutions should deal with 
disclosure requests relating to legal advice. It was held that when institutions 
are asked to disclose such a document, they must carry out a specific three-
stage procedure that corresponds to the three criteria set out by the Court.39 
Firstly, the institution must consider and satisfy itself that the document does 
relate to legal advice and if so to examine whether partial access can be 
given.40 Secondly, the institution is required to consider whether disclosure of 
any parts of the document would undermine the protection of the advice.41 
The Court noted that the exception must be understood in the light of the 
purpose of the Regulation. Under this, the exception “must be construed as 
aiming to protect an institution’s interest in seeking legal advice and receiving 
frank, objective and comprehensive advice”.42 Finally, it is incumbent on the 
institution to balance the interest in non-disclosure against any possible 
countervailing interest, bearing in mind the overall purpose to secure the 
widest possible access, giving a reasoned judgment.43 
 
What is most important for the interpretation given in Turco is the finding that 
the General Court erred in law in concluding that the raison d’être of the legal 
advice exception is not to avoid fuelling doubts over the legality of legislation. 
According to the wording of the Court of Justice, “it is in fact rather a lack of 
information and debate which is capable of giving rise to doubts in the minds 
of citizens, not only as regards the lawfulness of an isolated act, but also as 
regards the legitimacy of the decision-making process as a whole”. 44 
Therefore, while the judgment increases public access as regards legal 
advice, it also more fundamentally places the access rules next to the 
principles of democracy and civil participation in the Union’s overall decision-
making process. It does so in a way which highlights the ability of the citizenry 
to have access to information as one of Union’s fundamental credentials.  
 
By upholding the appeal, the Court of Justice reintroduced the cornerstone of 
the access regime and its relationship with the state of accountability and 
legitimacy in the EU. The ability of the citizenry to assess the impact, 
comment upon, influence the development of policies and finally hold the 
“government” accountable is highlighted throughout the judgment. It follows 
clearly from the reasoning of the Court that the EU is democratic in part 
because of the ability of the citizens to stay informed. Similarly and in contrast 
with what was ruled by the General Court, the overriding public interest 
pressing for disclosure of the legal advice needs to be no different from the 
principles of openness, transparency, democracy and civil participation in the 
decision-making process which already underlie the Regulation.45 The last 
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limb of the delicate balancing exercise is perhaps the greatest contribution of 
the Court in terms of accountability since it prioritises access amongst the 
countervailing interests at stake.  
 
Similarly, the validity of wider access in legislative matters was confirmed in 
Access info.46 The General Court ruled that the Council erred not to disclose 
the identity of countries taking positions on the reform of the EU’s access to 
documents rules. In light of this, the Court stated that the Council had “in no 
way demonstrated”47 how publication of the country names would “seriously 
undermine its decision-making process”.48  The Court further found that “if 
citizens are to be able to exercise their democratic rights, they must be in a 
position to follow in detail the decision-making process … and have access to 
all relevant information”.49 The Court of Justice confirmed this approach and 
rejected the appeal lodged by the Council.50 The Council, however, in practice 
continues not to publish the names of the national delegations and full access 
is confined to a successful request under the Regulation. More recently, the 
Court has ruled that the principle of wider access to documents in the 
legislative process also applies to documents drawn up before that process 
even formally starts, in the context of an impact assessment for the purposes 
of a planned legislative proposal.51 Moreover, the General Court has ruled 
that the principle of wider access in legislative procedures rules out any 
general presumption relating to trilogue documents.52  
 
The approach taken in Turco was indeed promising in terms of 
transparency.53 It clearly provided the foundations to disclose legal advice 
given also in the remit of the executive action of the EU institutions. This was 
upheld by the General Court and confirmed by the Court of Justice (as 
regards legal advice relating to international negotiations) in In’t Veld.54  
 
The Paradox of Turco: the “presumptions” doctrine 
 
While Turco was certainly a very progressive development as far as 
legislative documents were concerned, this judicial gift came with hidden 
limitations – rather like the legendary Trojan Horse. In particular, the judgment 
created the doctrine of “general presumptions” as a ground for refusing 
access to documents without individual consideration. According to the Court, 
“[i]t is in principle, open to the Council to base its decisions […] on general 
presumptions which apply to certain categories of documents, as 
                                                 
46
 Access Info Europe v Council (T-233/09) EU:T:2011:105. 
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54
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considerations of a generally similar kind are likely to apply to requests for 
disclosure relating to documents of the same nature.”55  
 
In effect, the Court ruled that the Council, and arguably by analogy all the 
other institutions, can deny access based on general considerations as 
opposed to the previously well-established duty for a specific and detailed 
examination of each request. After the Turco ruling, there was every 
possibility that the institutions, the Commission in particular, would rely on 
general considerations in order to avoid carrying out a concrete appraisal of 
the requested documents. The Court, with great respect, set the foundations 
to depart from the principle of transparency and to disregard almost two 
decades of jurisprudence. Indeed, the later developments, examined further 
below, provide with sufficient evidence to question the validity of the early 
finding that the judgment was spectacularly progressive.  
 
Administrative documents: the end of the one by one examination? 
 
Despite the adoption of the Regulation, the state of transparency in the EU is 
still problematic. The institutions continuously rely on a culture of secrecy and 
take every opportunity to deny access. They are bolstered not only by the 
presumptions doctrine (as discussed below) but also by an ‘administrative 
burdens’ exception, which was also developed by the Courts. In Verein für 
Konsumenteninformation,56 a consumers’ organization had sought access to 
the Commission’s administrative file containing 47,000 pages. The 
Commission refused access to the entire file on the grounds that partial 
access “would have represented an excessive and disproportionate amount of 
work for it”.57 In essence, the Commission denied access without even looking 
at the file, not even attempting to browse through the documents. But assume 
for a while that the Commission was right and the request was particularly 
burdensome. Assume further that the request could even paralyse the proper 
functioning of the institution. Should it result in the public being deprived from 
the fundamental right of access in such generic terms? Can it be considered 
as acceptable for the institutions to reduce the standards of transparency 
without invoking the exceptions provided by the Regulation?  
 
The Regulation does not provide in any provision for the requirements of 
concrete and individual assessment to be abandoned under any 
circumstances. While Article 6(3) provides for an informal consultation aiming 
to find a fair solution, Article 7(3) provides that the time limit for handling an 
application can, under certain circumstances, be extended. Similarly, the 
Court noted that in the absence of a fair solution mentioned in Article 6(3), the 
Regulation provides no exception similar to the one developed through the 
jurisprudence of the Courts relating to the administrative burden.58 The Court 
moved on to note that the principle of proportionality may justify refusal of a 
concrete and individual examination to avoid cases where a manifestly 
                                                 
55
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unreasonable number of documents is requested which could result in 
paralysis of the proper functioning of the institution.59 
 
According to the Court, Article 6(3) of the Regulation reflects the possibility 
that where a very large number of documents is requested the institution can 
“reconcile the interests of the applicant with those of good administration”.60 
As a result, there can be cases that require no individual examination. The 
Court observed that the possibility of non-concrete assessment must satisfy 
four requirements: 
 
i) The administrative burden entailed by concrete and individual examination 
must be heavy and exceed the limits of what may be reasonably required. 
 
ii) The burden of proof rests within the institution relying on its 
unreasonableness. 
 
iii) The institution must consult with the applicant in order to ascertain his 
interest and consider how it might adopt a measure less onerous than a 
concrete and individual examination. 
 
iv) The institution must prioritize the most favourable option for the applicant’s 
right of access.61 
  
With great respect to the judgment, the validity of the criteria quoted above 
can be questioned. The requirements lack proper foundation in the legislation. 
Had the legislature wanted to incorporate the pre-Regulation case law on 
administrative burden it would have had every opportunity to do so. Yet, the 
legislature did not do so because they could hardly see how this restriction 
could fit with the principle of the widest possible access and with the corollary 
fundamental legal standard to interpret the exceptions narrowly.  
 
The EU Courts developed further the restriction of the administrative burden 
rule through the “general presumptions” of non-disclosure. The latest 
tendency is that careful scrutiny of the requested documents is no longer 
necessary for certain categories of documents since similar considerations 
justifying application of one or more of the exceptions to the right of access 
are likely to apply to documents of the same nature. In this regard, the Court 
of Justice in TGI62 recognised the existence of a general presumption against 
disclosure with regards to state aid documents in the administrative file.63 In 
doing so, the Court established that state aid documents are essentially 
exempted from the document-by-document appraisal unless there is a higher 
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public interest justifying disclosure.64 But nevertheless, the Court has neither 
accepted nor explained any valid grounds that may be considered as 
satisfactory in terms of a higher public interest override. The Court has taken 
a similar approach to merger control, and to competition proceedings more 
generally.65  
 
The general presumption was also upheld in LPN66 in relation to infringement 
proceedings.67 On appeal, the applicants, LPN and Finland, argued that the 
Commission denied access without carrying out, in violation of settled case 
law, a concrete and individual assessment of the requested documents.68 The 
Court ruled “… that it can be presumed (emphasis added) that the disclosure 
of the documents concerning the infringement proceedings during the pre-
litigation stage risks altering the nature of that procedure and changing the 
way it proceeds and, accordingly, that disclosure would in principle undermine 
the protection of the purpose of investigations, within the meaning of the third 
indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001”.69 
 
The presumptions case law is in direct contrast with the Treaty framework, in 
particular with the requirements to take decisions as openly as possible 
pursuant to Article 1 TEU as well as with the overall wording of the 
Regulation. The Regulation provides no basis for the establishment of general 
presumptions. The Court of Justice’s position on presumptions imposes 
significant constitutional ramifications on the fundamental aspect of the 
access right and incorporates limitations without the required level of 
explanation and clarity. The LPN judgment considered that the interests of a 
non-governmental organisation with the aim of protecting the environment 
cannot be considered as particularly pertinent justifying disclosure. That 
makes one wonder if such an override cannot be established in an area 
where possible violations of EU law by Member States might take place then 
remains difficult to conceive a scenario where the override would ever be 
accepted by the Court. In essence, LPN treats in a rather paradoxical way a 
respectable non-governmental organisation as a mere “busybody” unable to 
invoke successfully the override.  
 
Judicial documents 
 
Equally restrictive is the approach of the Court in relation to its own 
documents. Currently, the Court may base its decisions on the grounds of 
general presumptions and rule that disclosure of judicial documents is 
                                                 
64
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capable of causing harm, in a foreseeable way, to the outcome of Court 
proceedings. In API,70 a non-profit-making organisation of foreign journalists 
made a request to have access to the Commission’s submissions regarding, 
inter alia, a number of ongoing cases and one which, although closed, was 
related to an open case.71  The General Court ruled that the Commission 
could issue a blanket refusal in relation to all documents so long as the oral 
argument in the Court proceedings had not yet been presented. The rationale 
behind this is to protect the Court proceedings from all external pressure until 
the case reaches the final stage of the hearing.72  
 
With great respect, the Court’s ruling was wrong to find that the Commission 
was in a position to refuse access to the whole category of judicial documents 
without following a concrete and individual examination and without stating 
detailed reasons. The blanket refusal accepted by the Court seems to 
misunderstand the rationale of the access to documents regime. 73  More 
importantly, it leaves the access to documents rules at a vulnerable stage. As 
already explained above, the mere fact that a document referred to in the 
application for access concerns an interest protected by an exception does 
not justify application of that exception. The exceptions are applicable only if 
the institution had previously assessed whether access would specifically and 
actually undermine the protected interest and, if so, there was no overriding 
public interest under Article 4(2) and (3). The risk of the protected interest 
being undermined must not be purely hypothetical. Consequently, the 
examination which the institution must undertake needs to be carried out in a 
concrete manner and be apparent from the reasons given. Only a concrete 
and individual examination, as opposed to an abstract, overall examination, 
would enable the institution to assess the possibility of granting the applicant 
partial access pursuant to Article 4(6) of the Regulation. The institution’s 
obligation to undertake this type of assessment is applicable to all the 
exceptions found in paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 4. 
 
On appeal, the Court concluded that access to judicial documents can be 
denied on the basis of general presumptions since considerations of a similar 
kind are likely to apply to documents of the same nature. 74  The Court 
confirmed that judicial documents are covered by a presumption against 
openness until the hearing date, and that disclosure of the pleadings would 
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undermine their protection, covered by the exception of the second indent of 
Article 4(2), while those proceedings remain pending.75 In consequence, the 
Commission bears no obligation “to carry out a concrete assessment of each 
document requested in order to determine whether, given the specific content 
of that document, its disclosure would undermine the Court proceedings to 
which it relates”.76 
 
With this judgment, the Court of Justice significantly curtailed the already 
limited public access as regards Court proceedings. Post API, the burden of 
proof to rebut the presumption of non-disclosure rests on the applicant, 
whereas previously the institutions had the burden to prove that concrete and 
individual examination was not necessary.77 This is deeply unsatisfactory for 
the state of transparency and in conjunction with the finding that the overriding 
public interest can only be taken into account as long as it is particularly 
pertinent effectively leaves with no access right as regards judicial 
documents. 78  Overall, the decision of the Court is problematic for two 
reasons. Firstly, it decreases dramatically public access as regards judicial 
documents, until a certain point and while the proceedings remain open, and 
sets the default position to non-disclosure. In terms of transparency, this is a 
significant step backwards. Applicants can no longer secure access for 
judicial documents unless they rebut, rather unlikely, the presumption of not 
disclosure. Secondly and more fundamentally, requires the applicant, rather 
illogically, to discharge the burden of the presumption, even though the 
plaintiff has no sight of the documents.   
 
While there is a clear strand in the case law about the general presumptions, 
still there are cases in which the EU Courts have rejected the idea of the 
presumption and pointed out to the opposite direction on the grounds that 
disclosure could not distort the decision-making process.79 Notably, the Court 
of Justice has confirmed in Breyer80 that while the presumption of refusal of 
Court documents held by the Commission also applies to such documents 
submitted by Member States, this presumption still only applies while the 
Court proceedings remain pending. Also, the issue of general presumptions 
does not arise in relation to Commission opinions on Member States’ draft 
technical regulations, since the ‘investigations’ exception to the transparency 
rules does not apply to such documents. 81  Furthermore, the general 
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presumption applying to infringement proceedings does not apply to general 
studies on national application of EU law which have not yet been used to 
trigger such proceedings.82 There is no general presumption as regards the 
information in the requests for quotation drawn up by the contracting authority 
under a framework procurement contract. 83  Nor is there a general 
presumption for the documents submitted for a marketing authorization 
application for a medical product, in particular clinical study reports. 84 
Similarly, there is no general presumption relating to the procedure for 
authorization of the use of chemicals.85 Finally, as noted already, no general 
presumption applies to documents drawn up in the context of an impact 
assessment for the purposes of a planned legislative proposal.86 
 
Nevertheless, general considerations leading to the presumption of non-
disclosure are well-established and very difficult to rebut.87 In practice, the 
nature of the requested documents gives rise to different judicial treatment. As 
already explained above, while the case law significantly increased public 
access as regards legislative documents it has set the default position as 
regards many non-legislative documents to non-disclosure. As a result, the 
presumptions case law reveals the existence of a paradox. We saw the Court 
confirm categorically over the last 20 years that openness secures public 
oversight of the EU’s decision-making, describing it as one of the fundamental 
credentials of the Union’s democratic society. Yet, the case law significantly 
decreases public access and leaves intact the possibility of the EU institutions 
to refuse access to the entire administrative file as regards particular 
categories of documents without even looking at them.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon attempted to rectify the transparency inadequacies by 
incorporating a generic obligation upon all the EU organs to function openly. 
In doing so, the Treaty has reinforced that, without access to the relevant 
information, citizens are unable to participate in the decision-making process, 
to monitor and finally to hold “governmental” actors accountable. In this way, 
transparency enhances awareness, illustrates understanding of the ultimate 
objectives that the decision-making processes aim to achieve and finally 
grants legitimacy upon the EU. Similarly, the transparency Regulation has 
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improved the position of the access regime in several aspects. Notably, it has 
codified the exceptions and confirmed the widest possible access.  
 
The judiciary has also contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to the 
development of the access right. It has done so in a more limited way as 
regards administrative and judicial documents. The extent to which the 
jurisprudence acknowledges the existence of general presumptions is 
fundamentally mistaken, lacking any support in the legislation or the Treaties. 
As a result of this case law, the institutions can now offer a wide justification 
often relating to the entire administrative file and provide no evidence that 
they considered less onerous ways of dealing with the request. This is 
especially true in the light of the significant number of cases involving general 
presumptions as regards the administrative functions of the institutions.88In 
practice, the presumptions case law establishes a clear distinction between 
legislative and non-legislative documents and confirms, contrary to the 
wording of the Regulation, the widest possible access with regards to the 
former category only. For a Union which is constantly struggling with 
allegations about its democratic deficit, perhaps a more balanced judicial 
attitude in respecting the rule of law as well as the transparency standards 
mandated by the legislature would be more appropriate. 
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